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Abstract 
Politicians have been shown to benefit electorally from an attractive physical 
appearance. Employing data on 614 German MPs, this note explores whether it also 
affects their success/failure in the market for extra-parliamentary activities. An 
attractive physical appearance is found to mainly benefit female MPs, especially for 
private-sector jobs. This is particularly driven by MPs’ perceived likability. While 
MP’s perceived beauty is shown to have no direct effects for extra-parliamentary 
activities, our findings suggest important indirect effects. 
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Looks Good, You’re Hired? 
Evidence from Extra-Parliamentary Activities of German 
Parliamentarians 
 
During the most recent UK elections of May 2010, significant controversy erupted when 
several Tory candidates – among which David Cameron (now Prime Minister) and Caroline 
Dinenage (now a Member of Parliament) – were alleged to employ digitally enhanced images 
of themselves on campaign posters. Part of the controversy derives from the fact that such 
alterations can manipulate voter preferences. For instance, Rosenberg and McCafferty (1987) 
– studying the effect of different photographs used by the same candidate on voter 
preferences in an actual election – and Rosenberg et al. (1991) – studying the effect of 
strategically manipulated photographs of 200 women in mock elections (making use of a 
make-up artist for the manipulation of women’s image) – illustrate that “it is possible to 
shape a political candidate’s image in a way which may affect electoral outcomes” 
(Rosenberg et al., 1991, 345). Moreover, newspaper editors have long known – and exploited 
– the value of (un)favorable photographs to support (undermine) the electoral campaigns of 
candidates they endorse (oppose) (e.g., Barrett and Barrington, 2005). Still, besides the 
normative aspects involved, taking recourse to airbrushing clearly indicates that politicians 
believe in the electoral importance of physical attractiveness. Recent academic work suggests 
they are right to do so (e.g., Banducci et al., 2008; Berggren et al., 2010). 
 
For politicians, however, the influence of physical appearance may extend beyond Election 
Day since MPs are often permitted to carry out jobs in addition to their political mandate 
(often referred to as moonlighting, Geys and Mause, 2013). Although such sideline jobs are 
welcomed in many traditions of representation as a source of additional knowledge and 
experience for MPs, they are often equated with personal greed and conflicts of interest by 
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the broader public (and the media); a view prominently reflected in the passionate public 
discussion in Germany in fall 2012.  As physical attractiveness can play an important role in 
employment settings (Hamermesh, 2011), one may wonder whether the influence of 
politicians’ physical (un)attractiveness persists into the market for extra-parliamentary jobs. 
We evaluate this proposition using a dataset of 197 female and 417 male German MPs’ 
physical appearance and extra-parliamentary activities over the period 10/2005-09/2007. 
 
Besides evaluating whether physical attractiveness benefits politicians not just on, but also 
after Election Day, this question is interesting for two related reasons. First, while earlier 
research on the benefits of physical attractiveness in employment settings predominantly 
concentrates on private-sector jobs (Hamermesh, 2011), our sample allows extending the 
focus to also include public-sector activities as politicians’ extra-parliamentary activities 
cover both private- and public-sector jobs. Second, MPs’ extra-parliamentary jobs often 
concern so-called ‘elite’ professions (e.g., board memberships, management consultants). It 
has been argued that beauty might in such a setting be detrimental for female individuals – a 
‘beauty is beastly’ effect (Heilman and Saruwatari, 1979; Heilman and Stopeck, 1985; Ruffle 
and Shtudiner, 2010). The reason is that beauty stresses gender-related perceptions of 
individuals (e.g., Gillen, 1981; Heilman and Stopeck, 1985), which tends to work against 
women in masculinely sex-typed jobs with an institutionalised male bias (due to ‘Think 
Manager, Think Male’ stereotypes; Schein, 1973; Dodge et al., 1995). Previous empirical 
work related to this idea relies, however, largely on laboratory experiments with student 
subjects (see, however, Ruffle and Shtudiner, 2012). 
 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, we find that physical appearance 
shows a positive relation to MPs’ extra-parliamentary activities, especially for female MPs 
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and particularly for private-sector jobs. Second, these results are mainly driven by MPs’ 
perceived likability, rather than perceived beauty. That is, the former has strong direct and, 
via its association with female MPs’ overall political success, indirect effects on politicians’ 
sideline activities, while MP’s perceived beauty only has an indirect effect (via female 
politicians’ improved re-election odds and prolonged tenure) but no direct effect. 
 
MPs’ extra-parliamentary activities 
Members of the German Bundestag are legally allowed to carry out professional activities in 
addition to their political mandate, but have to disclose activities falling into the following 
categories: (1) “paid activities in addition to the mandate” (e.g., management consultant); 
(2) “member of the management, supervisory, administrative, advisory or other board in a 
private enterprise”; (3) similar activities “in local authorities or public corporations”; 
(4) similar activities “in clubs, associations and foundations not solely of local significance”; 
(5) “agreements on future activities or pecuniary advantages”; (6) “investments in business 
companies” (if MP has a voting share of more than 25%). Information on such activities for 
all 614 Bundestag members (197 women and 417 men) in the period 10/2005 to 09/2007 is 
extracted from the 2007 Official Handbook of the German Bundestag.1 Although self-
reported, fines for misreporting equal to maximally half the MPs’ annual allowance imply 
that the data provided is likely to be complete and correct. Consequently, it has been 
employed in various studies (e.g., Becker et al., 2009; Mause, 2009; Niessen and Ruenzi, 
2010). Yet, none of these link the data to (perceptions of) politicians’ physical appearance. 
 
1  The starting point of the data reflects a change in legislation, and implies we cannot observe whether jobs 
were held already prior to that date. We exclude category (5) below as we are interested in MPs’ current 
sideline activities. Note also that repeated activities (e.g., a series of public lectures) are treated as one 
activity. 
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Table 1 presents the number of MPs with a given number of sideline jobs. The overall 
number of ancillary activities for each MP (‘all jobs’) is counted as the sum of activities in 
categories (1) through (4) and (6). Private-sector jobs are defined as activities in categories 
(2) and (6), plus category (1) for activities not performed in the political system (e.g., state 
secretary, minister). Sideline activities in the public sector count ancillary activities in 
categories (1) and (3) – again excluding activities in the political system – plus category (4). 
We excluded political jobs as these mostly concern elected offices and cannot be interpreted 
as deriving from a labour-market recruitment process. While Table 1 substantiates that most 
politicians do maintain extra-parliamentary activities (i.e. only 74 out of the 614 German 
MPs in our sample have no such jobs), it also establishes that MPs are in general more likely 
to have public-sector (81% of MPs in our sample), rather than private-sector (51% in our 
sample), outside jobs. The median value lies at three outside jobs. 
 
-- Table 1 here -- 
 
Note that we employ the number of outside activities as an indicator for MPs’ labour market 
success. While MPs’ remuneration might be considered as an additional measure and German 
MPs disclose some information on income received from outside activities (Geys and Mause, 
2012; Peichl et al., 2013), we do not exploit this information here. The reason is that the 
income-data are only made public in three income bands (€1000–3500, €3500–7000 and 
above €7000), and politicians themselves can indicate whether income is received annually or 
monthly. As this allows politicians to “game the system” and hide substantial revenue 
streams, the income data lack reliability (Geys and Mause, 2012, 267; a similar view on 
analogous US data is also provided in Rosenson, 2007). Even so, it is important to highlight 
that the number of outside jobs employed here is positively correlated to a (admittedly crude) 
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measure of earnings constructed from the available income information by assuming that the 
MP earns the lower end of the income band for each job reported (for further details, see 
Mause, 2009). Hence, the number of outside jobs appears a reasonable measure of success on 
the market for sideline jobs. 
 
MPs’ physical appearance  
To employ perceptions of politicians’ physical appearance as an explanatory factor, they 
should contain a common understanding of what it means to be, say, ‘beautiful’. Fortunately, 
various studies have shown this to be the case both within and across cultures (e.g., Langlois 
et al., 2000; Berggren et al., 2010). On this basis, we conducted a web-based survey asking 
individuals to evaluate photographs of our sample of 614 politicians (photos taken from the 
Official Handbook of the German Bundestag). These photographs have a standardised format 
(i.e. black-and-white headshots), which prevents variation in the characteristics of the 
pictures from affecting reported perceptions (Berggren et al., 2010). In line with previous 
work, we asked: “Based on the picture provided, what do you think of this person – compared 
to people living in your country – in terms of […]” and repeated this question for five traits: 
i.e. ‘physical appearance or attractiveness’, ‘competence’, ‘likability (i.e. how nice, pleasant 
and agreeable you find this person)’, ‘trustworthiness (i.e. how ethical, honest and 
responsible you find this person) and ‘intelligence’. Respondents replied on a five-point scale 
from ‘very positive’ (5) to ‘very negative’ (1). No information beside the picture was 
provided. Although perceptions need not reflect politicians’ ‘true’ characteristics, they drive 
people’s decisions and behaviour, which warrants their use here (Hamermesh, 2011). 
 
In total, 4817 evaluations were obtained from 15 female and 13 male respondents between 20 
and 60 years old (only 12 were students) with an average of 7.5 evaluations per picture. To 
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minimize recognition bias, we used respondents in Belgium, France, Slovakia, Hungary, 
United States and United Kingdom (as well as one German respondent), and removed the 
observation when respondents recognised the person in the picture.2 The final number of 
evaluations per picture ranges from 3 to 24. This number lies close to the number of 
evaluations employed in Berggren et al. (2010) – who delete observations with fewer than 
three evaluations, and have on average 9 evaluations per picture – and Hamermesh (2004) – 
who relies on 4 evaluations per picture. Clearly, one might worry that three evaluations is 
insufficient. To check this, we assess whether the coefficient of variation is higher for 
pictures with fewer evaluations (which would reflect more ‘noise’ surrounding the estimated 
evaluation). Comparing pictures obtaining less than 10 evaluations with those obtaining 
between 10 and 19 evaluations, we find no such effect. Hence, even relatively few 
evaluations appear to give a fairly precise estimate. 
 
Overall, Spearman rank-order correlation tests show high inter-rater agreement. The test 
statistics range from ρ=0.237 to ρ =0.847 with associated p-values ranging from 0.12 to 0.00 
(with one exception where ρ=0.054; p<0.10). Significance levels under the 90% confidence 
level thereby occur only when raters have less than 60 pictures in common. Even so, 
Berggren et al. (2010) show that their findings are robust to whether individuals evaluate 
over 500 pictures or only four, which suggests that the properties of the rating distribution are 
not overly sensitive to the number of evaluations. Following the ‘truth of consensus’ method 
(Banducci et al., 2008), we calculate the average of the independent evaluations across raters 
2  Given the international composition of our respondent sample, recognition of politicians was only a minor 
issue, and did not require the exclusion of any politician due a lack of valid (i.e. unbiased by personal 
recognition) evaluations.  
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for a given politician on each of the five characteristics.3 Summary statistics across all 614 
politicians – as well as the subsamples of men and women – are given in Table 2. This 
illustrates that women are on average perceived to be more beautiful (2.88 vs. 2.54; p<0.01), 
more likable (3.08 vs. 2.71; p<0.01) and more trustworthy (3.08 vs. 2.64; p<0.01) than men. 
No significant difference exists for perceived competence and intelligence, indicating no bias 
against female politicians in terms of intellectual and professional capacities. 
 
-- Table 2 here -- 
 
Empirical Results 
Physical appearance and extra-parliamentary jobs 
To evaluate the relation between physical attractiveness and politicians’ extra-parliamentary 
jobs, we estimate the following regression model: 
 i
j
iij
j
ij
j
i
j
ii PhysAttrFemaleFemalePhysAttrXY εββββα +++++= ∑∑ *4321  (1) 
where Yi represents either MPi’s total number of sideline activities (‘all jobs’) or his/her 
sideline activities in the private (‘Private-sector’) or public (‘Public-sector’) sector. Equation 
(1) is estimated separately for each of these three dependent variables. PhysAttrij is measured 
as the average of the independent evaluations for MPi across raters for three aspects of his/her 
3  This implicitly assumes that all raters have the same perception of average beauty, competence, likability, … 
and of the variation around that mean. Clearly, this need not be the case. Hence, we also calculated 
standardised scores by subtracting the mean rating of each rater from every individual rating (s)he makes, 
and normalising the resulting score by dividing it with this rater’s standard deviation (see also Johnson et al., 
2010; Belot et al., 2012). The standardised and unstandardised measures are highly correlated (r=0.97; 
p<0.001) for all five personal traits – and using either provides similar results in the analysis below (details 
upon request).  
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(perceived) physical appearance (i.e. j = Beauty, Likability, Competence).4 To evaluate 
whether these effects of physical appearance differ across gender, we include Femalei (an 
indicator variable equal to 1 for female MPs, 0 for males) and an interaction of PhysAttrij 
with Femalei. To minimize missing-variable bias, Xi is a vector of control variables including 
MPi’s party affiliation (dummies for SPD, FDP, GRÜNE and LINKE; CDU/CSU is reference 
category), home federal state (dummy for former East-German Länder), type of mandate (i.e., 
party-list vs. direct mandate), number of legislative periods attended, age, marital status 
(dummy: 1 if married), number of children, educational background (dummy: 1 if university 
education), profession (dummies for legal, economic and teacher background), religious 
affiliation and whether MPi holds an important political office (e.g. leader of parliamentary 
fraction or Bundestag (vice-)president). Since the dependent variables only take non-negative 
integer values and have highly skewed distributions, we employ a negative binomial count 
model to estimate equation (1) (tests of overdispersion suggest Poisson models are 
inappropriate).  
 
-- Table 3 here -- 
 
The key findings are brought together in Table 3.5 Column (1) shows that, all else equal, 
MPs’ (perceived) beauty bears no significant relation to the total extent of their sideline 
activities. Indeed, for both men ( beauty2βˆ =0.042; p<0.10) and women 
4  We did not include all five traits into the model due to the strong positive correlation between them, and the 
significant multicollinearity problems this induces. 
5  As results for the control variables follow those reported in the foregoing literature, we suppress these to 
preserve space (details upon request). See, for example, Becker et al. (2009) or Mause (2009). 
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( beauty2βˆ +
beauty
4βˆ =0.042+(–0.116)= –0.074; p<0.10),6 the coefficient estimates remain well 
below standard levels of statistical significance – thus invalidating the presence of any 
‘beauty is beastly’ effect in this setting. Separating private-sector (Column (2)) from public-
sector (Column (3)) jobs provides similar insignificant results. The same also holds for MPs’ 
perceived competence, which returns statistically insignificant effects throughout Table 3 for 
both men and women. The measure of perceived likability, however, shows a significant 
positive relation to an MPs’ total number of outside jobs. The effect size is substantively 
meaningful: i.e. evaluated at the mean of all variables included in the model, a one standard 
deviation increase in a male politician’s likability evaluation (0.436; see Table 2) increases 
the number of outside activities by approximately one tenth of a standard deviation (or 0.388 
jobs). For women, a one standard deviation increase in perceived likability (0.432; see Table 
2) induces an increase in extra-parliamentary jobs by almost one third of a standard deviation 
(or 1.036 jobs).  
 
For public-sector jobs, this likability benefit holds for women and men (though it is 
substantively stronger for the former), while for private-sector jobs, it applies only to women 
( likability2βˆ +
likability
4βˆ =0.203+0.704=0.907; Chi²=7.08; p<0.01). Particularly, once again 
evaluated at the mean of all variables, a one standard deviation increase in a politician’s 
perceived likability increases the number of public-sector outside activities by almost one 
tenth of a standard deviation (or 0.276 jobs) for men, and just under one quarter of a standard 
deviation (or 0.670 jobs) for women. The same increase in likability gains women just over 
one third of a standard deviation or 0.334 private-sector jobs. One possible explanation for 
6  The estimated significance level for women is calculated taking into account that the standard error around 
the coefficient estimate ( 3βˆ  + 
beauty
4βˆ ) also depends on the covariance of 3βˆ  and 
beauty
4βˆ  (Brambor et al., 
2006). 
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this difference between the public and private sector is that recruiting for public-sector jobs is 
usually not on a personal basis, but in many cases at least in part reflects partisan attachments 
(making that physical appearance matters less). It is important to note here that we also 
experimented with measures for a more complete set of perceived personality traits (i.e. 
beauty, competence, likability, intelligence and trustworthiness). This does not affect the 
main findings reported above. That is, in all cases, we find that i) physical appearance shows 
a positive relation to MPs’ extra-parliamentary activities and ii) likability is the most 
important factor among the different dimensions of physical appearance included here 
(details upon request). 
 
The discovery of a significant likability effect supports earlier findings illustrating that 
“teachers, employees, defendants in court cases, salespeople, prospective employees, and 
even cocktail waitresses (…) reap the benefits of likability” (Jayanti and Whipple, 2008; see 
also Casciaro and Sousa Lobo, 2005). In our setting, this effect might arise because likability 
may be particularly desirable in the type of jobs politicians entertain as extra-parliamentary 
activities, which are mostly of a representational nature. Nonetheless, one might wonder why 
perceived beauty – which has been frequently shown to play an important role in employment 
settings (Hamermesh, 2011) – is found to display no significant direct relation to MPs’ extra-
parliamentary activities in Columns (1) through (3). From this perspective, it should be noted 
that although beauty has no significant direct effect, it is likely to have at least some indirect 
effect. The reason is that beauty correlates with likability, such that it may indirectly affect 
the dependent variable through its effect on likability. 
 
More generally, it is at least conceivable that all attributes reflecting MPs’ perceived physical 
attractiveness employed here (e.g. beauty and likability) have additional indirect effects on 
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politicians’ extra-parliamentary jobs since they increase the probability that politicians 
become (re-)elected (Banducci et al., 2008; Berggren et al., 2010), and may affect their 
political success more generally (e.g., by affecting the likelihood of obtaining leadership 
positions). Such political success is picked up by several control variables in vector Xi (e.g. 
their tenure in office or the indicator variables for important political offices), which often do 
display a significant association with sideline jobs (see, for example, Becker et al., 2009, or 
Mause, 2009). Hence, one might argue that the analysis above gives only a partial view of 
physical appearance’s relation to extra-parliamentary jobs, because it does not explicitly 
illustrate the existence and/or strength of such indirect effects. We therefore turn to this more 
explicitly in the next section. 
 
Physical appearance and political success7 
To evaluate the indirect effects of MPs’ physical appearance on sideline jobs in more detail, 
we look at the relation between physical attractiveness and politicians’ political success using 
the following regression model (with subscript i referring to MPs): 
 
 i
j
iij
j
ij
j
i
j
ii PhysAttrFemaleFemalePhysAttrCSuccess εββββα +++++= ∑∑ *4321  (2) 
 
where Successi represents either MPi’s number of legislative periods (‘Tenure’, as a measure 
or re-election successes), his/her number of memberships in parliamentary committees 
(‘Committees’), or an indicator variable equal to 1 if the MP is minister, secretary of state, 
part of the leadership of the party’s parliamentary group, (deputy) committee leader or 
Bundestag (vice-)president (‘Importance office’). While PhysAttrij and Femalei are defined as 
above, the vector of control variables Ci now includes MPi’s party affiliation, home federal 
7  We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out, and for excellent suggestions on how to 
approach this in more detail. 
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state, type of mandate, number of legislative periods attended, age, marital status, number of 
children, educational background, profession and religious affiliation. The key findings are 
brought together in Table 4. Note that given the nature of the dependent variables, columns 
(4) and (5) are estimated using a Poisson regression, while column (6) is based on a logit 
model. 
 
-- Table 4 here -- 
 
Table 4 first of all illustrates that, all else equal, perceived physical appearance shows no 
significant relation to male MPs’ tenure in office (Column (4)), their committee memberships 
(Column (5)), nor the probability of obtaining a leadership position in German politics 
(Column (6)). To evaluate the results for female politicians, we – as before – have to add the 
baseline effects to those of the interaction terms, and re-calculate the standard error around 
this point estimate taking into account the covariance of the coefficients of the baseline and 
interaction effects. This shows that, for female MPs’, perceived beauty is significantly 
positively related to higher tenure ( beauty2βˆ +
beauty
4βˆ =0.018+0.143=0.161; p=0.02), which 
indicates a higher re-election probability for physically attractive female MPs (in line with, 
for instance, Banducci et al., 2008; Berggren et al., 2010). Perceived beauty displays a much 
weaker association to holding an important political office ( beauty2βˆ +
beauty
4βˆ =–0.030+0.538= 
0.508; p=0.21), and even a negative connection to committee memberships 
( beauty2βˆ +
beauty
4βˆ =0.041+(–0.206)= –0.165; p=0.09). 
 
Interestingly, much the reverse pattern is observed for perceived likability. This plays no 
significant role for female MPs’ tenure ( likability2βˆ +
likability
4βˆ =0.013+0.081=0.094; p=0.31), but 
is significantly positively related to committee memberships 
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( likability2βˆ +
likability
4βˆ =0.042+0.237=0.279; p=0.02) and holding an important political office 
( likability2βˆ +
likability
4βˆ =0.418+0.473= 0.891; p=0.05). No significant effects are observed for 
perceived competence on all three measures of political success. Taken together, these results 
suggest that (perceived) physical beauty appears to provide a benefit to (particularly female) 
politicians in the electoral arena, but that (perceived) likability is a more valuable asset once 
the elections are over. This configuration may well reflect the varying preferences of the 
different decision makers at both time points of the democratic process: i.e. voters in 
elections and other politicians after the elections.  
 
As tenure and holding important political offices positively affect MPs’ outside jobs 
(β=0.044; p<0.05 for tenure, and β=0.164; p<0.10 for holding important political offices),8 
the above results suggest an indirect effect from female MPs’ perceived beauty and likability 
on their extra-parliamentary activities. Still, calculating the strength of these indirect effects, 
we find that the gains associated with MPs’ physical appearance in terms of their political 
success translate into at best marginal (indirect) benefits in terms of additional outside jobs. 
For instance, evaluated at the mean of all variables, a one standard deviation increase in a 
female politician’s perceived beauty increases her tenure with 0.249 terms, which, in turn, 
translates into an increase of her outside activities by 0.044 jobs. Similarly, a one standard 
deviation increase in perceived likability increases a female MPs’ probability of holding an 
important political office with 7.17 percent, which, in turn, translates into an increase of her 
outside activities by 0.039 jobs. 
 
Before we conclude, it appears that in general the effect of likability is substantially stronger 
for female politicians, which, given women’s higher average perceived likability, might put 
8 Note that no significant relation is observed between committee memberships and MPs’ outside jobs. 
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them at a competitive advantage. One potential explanation for the gendered nature of the 
likability effect is that personality characteristics generally associated with likability are 
mostly conceived of as feminine (Diekman and Eagly, 2000). This might make the 
male/likeable combination more conspicuous since it does not conform to expectations 
(Judge et al., 2012). As such gender-role incongruence (Nieva and Gutek, 1981) has been 
found to elicit penalties including social rejection, negative evaluations and lower income 
levels (Costrich et al., 1975; Amanatullah and Tinsley, 2013), it may explain the weaker 
likability premium among male politicians. 
 
Conclusion 
Recent studies indicate that physically attractive politicians generally obtain more votes 
(Banducci et al., 2008; Berggren et al., 2010). This research note extended this literature by 
arguing that physical attractiveness might well benefit politicians not just on, but also after 
Election Day. Using data on German MPs’ extra-parliamentary positions, we indeed illustrate 
that (perceived) likability benefits (especially female) MPs for both private- and public-sector 
jobs. The likability effects thus uncovered are both statistically and substantively meaningful. 
For MPs’ perceived physical attractiveness, we find that it may well have an indirect effect 
on politicians’ extra-parliamentary activities, but a direct effect of beauty cannot be 
substantiated. 
 
These findings raise a number of important additional questions. First, do our results carry 
over to general employment settings? That is, is the fact that we analyse politicians – which 
are ‘pre-selected’ via elections in which their personality traits are an important factor for 
success – important for our results or would they likewise hold in traditional recruitment 
settings (where candidates are not similarly pre-selected)?  Second, our findings suggest an 
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unequal role for likability and competence, which immediately leads to the question whether 
we desire a ‘lovable fool’ or ‘competent jerk’ to work with (assuming a ‘lovable star’ is not 
available; labels taken from Casciaro and Sousa Lobo, 2005). This has, surprisingly, received 
little attention in either the labour economics, or the occupational psychology literature thus 
far (see, however, Singh and Tor, 2008) and presents an interesting avenue for future 
(experimental) research. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics politicians’ sideline jobs 
 
0 jobs 1 job 2 jobs 3 jobs 4 jobs 5 jobs 6 jobs 7 jobs > 7 jobs 
All jobs 74 76 101 90 58 56 38 34 87 
Private sector 304 154 66 37 20 12 6 3 12 
Public sector 117 105 114 81 65 42 30 18 42 
Note:  Entries represent the number of politicians reporting a given number of sideline activitities. We report separate 
results for all sideline activitities (‘all jobs’) and those in the public and private sectors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics perceptions of politicians’ perceived traits 
 
Beauty Competence Likability Trustworthiness Intelligence 
Overall 
(N=614) 
2.646 
(0.542) 
2.944 
(0.370) 
2.825 
(0.467) 
2.779 
(0.443) 
3.025 
(0.382) 
Men 
(N=417) 
2.537 
(0.496) 
2.933 
(0.364) 
2.707 
(0.436) 
2.636 
(0.398) 
3.037 
(0.373) 
Women 
(N=197) 
2.877 
(0.565) 
2.966 
(0.383) 
3.076 
(0.432) 
3.083 
(0.375) 
2.999 
(0.398) 
 
Men vs. Women 
 
7.226 *** 
 
1.042 
 
9.841 *** 
 
13.521 *** 
 
-1.139 
Note:  Entries represent mean values, with standard deviation between brackets (5 is ‘best’ score and 1 is ‘worst’ 
score). ‘Men vs. Women’ gives t-value of difference-in-means t-test allowing for unequal variance across 
samples.  *** significant at 1%; ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
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Table 3: Physical appearance and extra-parliamentary activities 
Variable All jobs 
 (1) 
Private-sector  
 (2) 
Public-sector  
 (3) 
Beauty 
(1=plain; 5=beautiful) 
0.042 
(0.39) 
-0.021 
(-0.10) 
0.110 
(0.94) 
Competence 
(1=inept; 5=competent) 
-0.252 * 
(-1.74) 
-0.268 
(-1.25) 
-0.262 
(-1.59) 
Likability 
(1=likable; 5=likable) 
0.239 ** 
(2.05) 
0.203 
(1.11) 
0.240 * 
(1.86) 
Female * Beauty -0.116 
(-0.71) 
0.258 
(0.79) 
-0.256 
(-1.54) 
Female * Competence 0.300 
(1.32) 
0.480 
(1.18) 
0.270 
(1.11) 
Female * Likability 0.405 ** 
(2.07) 
0.704 * 
(1.83) 
0.347 
(1.64) 
Log pseudolikelihood 
Wald Chi² (R) 
-1443.79 
163.46 *** 
-826.28 
189.77 *** 
-1279.58 
128.13 *** 
Note:  N=614; t-values based on robust standard errors between brackets: *** significant at 1%; ** at 5% and * 
at 10%. Wald-test indicates joint significance of all regressors (with R equal to the number of regressors 
minus one). Intercept and full set of controls always included. Note that the variables for beauty, 
competence and likability are the mean of evaluations on a 5-point scale (see text for details). Given the 
nature of the dependent variables, all estimations rely on negative binomial count models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Physical appearance and political success 
Variable Tenure 
 (4) 
Committees 
 (5) 
Important office 
 (6) 
Beauty 
(1=plain; 5=beautiful) 
0.018 
(0.25) 
0.041 
(0.47) 
-0.030 
(-0.09) 
Competence 
(1=inept; 5=competent) 
0.011 
(0.12) 
-0.049 
(-0.47) 
0.272 
(0.65) 
Likability 
(1=likable; 5=likable) 
0.013 
(0.18) 
0.042 
(0.44) 
0.418 
(1.30) 
Female * Beauty 0.143 
(1.53) 
-0.206 * 
(-1.66) 
0.538 
(1.06) 
Female * Competence -0.155 
(-1.18) 
-0.123 
(-0.66) 
0.477 
(0.67) 
Female * Likability 0.081 
(0.68) 
0.237 
(1.54) 
0.473 
(0.86) 
Log pseudolikelihood 
Wald Chi² (R) 
-1064.91 
418.10 *** 
-923.59 
36.44 ** 
-334.64 
39.66 ** 
Note:  N=614; t-values based on robust standard errors between brackets: *** significant at 1%; ** at 5% and * 
at 10%. Wald-test indicates joint significance of all regressors (with R equal to the number of regressors 
minus one). Intercept and full set of socio-demographic background controls always included. Note that 
the variables for beauty, competence and likability are the mean of evaluations on a 5-point scale (see text 
for details). Given the nature of the dependent variables, columns (4) and (5) are estimated using a 
Poisson regression, while column (6) is based on a logit model. 
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